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RECONCILIATION TRAP: CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 155
Plaintiff obtained a divorce and thereafter sought a partition of the
alleged community of acquets and gains acquired between 1972 and 1980.
The couple had been judicially separated in September of 1972, but had
reconciled six months later by resuming their marital life. After the recon-
ciliation, the husband had acquired a family home and the corporate stock
of Freeman Chemical and Cementing Company, Inc. They lived together
as husband and wife until suit for divorce was filed on January 25, 1980.
On May 29, 1980 they were awarded a final divorce. In response to
plaintiff-wife's petition for partition of the property acquired by the couple
between 1972 and their divorce, the defendant-husband filed an exception
of no cause and no right of action. The trial court overruled these excep-
tions, and the case was tried on the merits. The lower court held that
the family home and corporate stock belonged to the husband's separate
estate, and the wife appealed. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of
Appeal, basing its decision on strict compliance with Civil Code article
155, affirmed the trial court's decision. The second circuit held that upon
reconciliation after a judgment of separation from bed and board, the
community of acquets and gains could be reestablished prior to January
1, 1980 only by execution of an authentic act properly recorded in the
conveyance records of the parish in which the couple resided, and after
January 1 1980, by matrimonial agreement. Freeman v. Freeman, 430 So.
2d 673 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 So. 2d 449 (1983).
When two people resume marital life after a judgment of separation
from bed and board, as in Freeman, they do not always consider the
consequences of their actions. Although the judicial separation from bed
and board does not end the marriage,' it does terminate the conjugal
cohabitation between the spouses.2 In addition, the judgment of separa-
tion terminates the community retroactively to the date of filing of the
petition upon which the separation was granted.3 Once the community
is dissolved, the parties become co-owners in indivision of the property
Copyright 1984, by Louisiana Law Review.
1. La. Civ. Code art. 136.
2. Boucvalt v. Boucvalt, 235 La. 421, 104 So. 2d 157 (1958); Hillard v. Hillard, 225
La. 507, 73 So. 2d 442 (1954).
3. La. Civ. Code art. 155. Patterson v. Patterson, 417 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 420 So. 2d 983 (La. 1982); Dhuet v. Taylor, 383 So. 2d 1061 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1980); Borne v. Jersey Ins. Co., 98 So. 2d 906 (La. App. Orl. 1957); see also La.
Civ. Code art. 2356, comment c.
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comprised by the former community.'
Reconciliation of the spouses prior to divorce extinguishes both the
judgment of separation from bed and board' and any judicial grant of
alimony pendente lite.6 Reconciliation does not accomplish the reestablish-
ment of the former community of acquets and gains. Civil Code article
155 declares that after spouses reconcile "the community may be re-
established by matrimonial agreement, as of the date of filing of the
original petition in the action in which the judgment was rendered."
Article 155 did not originally provide for reestablishment of the com-
munity of acquets and gains. Article 155 originated in the Louisiana Digest
of 1808 as Article 17, which provided: "Separation from bed and board
carries with it separation of goods and effects." 7 Article 17 appears to
be an almost exact translation of article 311 of the French Civil Code.'
In the Civil Code of 1825, article 155 appeared as article 151, 9 and received
its current designation as article 155 in the Civil Code of 1870."0
The original judicial interpretation of article 155 in Ford v. Kittredge"
excluded the reestablishment of the community once it had been dissolved.
In interpreting Article 155 the court applied the principle of statutory con-
struction embodied in the maxim "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius."" 2
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Ford, reasoned that since the redactors
failed to provide for reestablishment of the community after reconcilia-
tion, in contrast to the French Civil Code which did allow reestablish-
ment, then the court could not make such a law.' 3 In Succession of Le
Besque the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
[Tihere is no law which says that a reconciliation of the spouses
superinduces a partnership or community of acquets or gains, as
is superinduced by marriage. The court is without authority to
4. See, e.g., Daigre v. Daigre, 230 La. 472, 89 So. 2d 41 (1956); Dhuet v. Taylor,
383 So. 2d 1061 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Cooper v. Cooper, 303 So. 2d 319 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974); McAdams v. McAdams, 267 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972). To divide
the former community property the spouses may enter into a mutual agreement of partition
or petition the court for a judicial partititon. See La. Civ. Code art. 2328; La. R.S. 9:2801
(Supp. 1983).
5. La. Civ. Code arts. 119, 148, 152; Moody v. Moody, 227 La. 134, 78 So. 2d 536
(1955); Reichert v. Lloveras, 188 La. 447, 177 So. 569 (1937).
6. See, e.g., Reichert v. Lloveras, 188 La. at 450-51, 177 So. at 570 (1937).
7. La. Digest of 1808 bk. I, tit. V, art. 17.
8. Code Napoleon art. 311 (1804) ("Separation from bed and board shall always carry
with it separation of goods and effects.").
9. La. Civ. Code art. 151 (1825).
10. La. Civ. Code art. 155 (1870).
11. 26 La. Ann. 190 (1874).
12. The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. Comment, Reconciliation and
the Re-Establishment of the Community, I La. L. Rev. 422, 424 (1939).
13. Ford, 26 La. Ann. at 193. See Comment, supra, note 12, at 424.
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legislate upon the subject; and as it has been twice decided that
the community of acquets and gains is not re-established by the
reconciliation of the parties, the property acquired after a separa-
tion from bed and board by either or both spouses remains the
separate property of him or her who acquired it.'
By the late 1930's several cases" had been decided wherein a wife
who had reconciled with her husband after a judgment of separation from
bed and board was denied any interest in the property accumulated after
the reconciliation. In 1943 Professor Harriet S. Daggett suggested that,
contrary to article 155, the law should be amended to read: "the com-
munity be not dissolved by judgment of separation of bed and board
in cases where reconciliation has taken place."' 6 She also made an alter-
native suggestion that the law be amended to follow the French method
to permit a couple to reestablish the community by authentic act after
a reconciliation. 7 The legislature in 1944 adopted the alternative proposal:
Separation from bed and board carries with its [sic] separation
of goods and effects. Upon reconciliation of the spouses, the com-
munity may be re-established by husband and wife jointly, as of
the date of the filing of the suit for separation from bed and
board, by an act before a notary, and two witnesses, which act
shall be recorded in the conveyance records of the Parish where
said parties are domiciled.'"
Commenting on the anticipated effect and dangers of this amendment
Professor Daggett stated:
The only danger may be to those who are not aware of this ef-
fect of the judgment of separation nor of the new remedy ....
[They] may suffer the same surprise and discomfort attendant
upon the final discovery as has often been the case in the past.
Particularly is this true, of course, of the wife.' 9
14. Succession of Le Besque, 137 La. 567, 570, 68 So. 956, 957 (1915).
15. Reichert v. Lloveras, 188 La. 447, 177 So. 569 (1937); Succession of Le Besque,
137 La. 567, 68 So. 956 (1915); Crochet v. Dugas, 126 La. 285, 52 So. 495 (1910); Ford
v. Kittredge, 26 La. Ann. 190 (1874).
16. Daggett, Suggestions for the Consideration of the Council of the Louisiana State
Institute, 5 La. L. Rev. 377, 395 (1943).
17. Daggett, supra note 16, at 395.
18. 1944 La. Acts, No. 200 § 1, amending La. Civ. Code art. 155. Act 304 of 1950
amended article 155 by adding at the end "but which act shall be without prejudice to
rights validly acquired in the interim." Section 1 of Act 178 of 1962 amended article 155
by providing for retroactive effect of the dissolution of the community but reduced creditors
rights to "rights validly acquired in the interim between commencement of the action and
recordation of judgment." Act. 178 also provided for liability of the community for at-
tofney fees and costs that the wife incurred in obtaining the separation. See La. Civ. Code
art. 155 (1972 Comp. Ed., in 16 West's La. State Ann-Civ. Code).
19. Daggett, Louisiana Legislation of 1944-Matters Pertaining to the Civil Code, 6
1984]
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Within a few years, her warnings came true in the case of Cotton
v. Wright. 0 Because the spouses in Cotton lacked knowledge of the 1944
amendment, they failed to execute an authentic set to restablish the com-
munity after the reconciliation. As a result, the court denied the wife an
interest in the property acquired after the reconciliation. In Austin v. Suc-
cession of Austin,2 a wife who had been led to believe .by her husband
that the community had been reestablished was denied her claim for an
interest in the property of her deceased husband. The supreme court, citing
article 155, held that the spouses had not reestablished the community
in the manner prescribed by law; therefore, the community stood dissolved.
The court announced the jurisprudential rule that "only by the privilege
conferred in the act of 1950 can the community be re-established, and
it must be done with the forms and solemnities of the law as that act
has prescribed." 2 In Austin, the wife asserted a claim to equitable owner-
ship of the property, which the court rejected, based on the proposition
that "where parties marry according to the forms and solemnities of the
law and where their rights are settled by the express provisions of the
Code, there can be no appeal to equity .... 23 The court also rejected
a claim to the property on a quantum meruit basis since there was no
proof of a verbal contract. Furthermore, the court knew of no law whereby
"a wife may recover from the estate of her deceased husband on a quan-
tum meruit basis." 24
In Freeman v. Freeman, both spouses testified that at the time the
stock was acquired in Freeman Chemical and Cementing Company they
believed they were living in community and that the stock was commu-
nity property.2" Both spouses further testified that they were unaware that
an authentic act was required to reestablish the community. The plain-
tiff contended that this lack of knowledge resulted in mutual error and
a presumption by both parties that they had acquired the joint ownership
of the stock-the husband had acquired the stock from his father;
however, to pay for the stock the spouses had to borrow $30,000.00 from
the wife's father. The corporation gave its note as security for the loan;
however, the wife's father also made additional loans to the corporation
of $17,000.00 for operating expenses during the first year of operation.
La. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1944).
20. 214 La. 169, 36 So. 2d 713 (1948).
21. 225 La. 449, 73 So. 2d 312 (1954). The court dismissed the plaintiff's assertion
because she did not submit any proof of an act to support her claim of reestablishment
of the community.
22. Id. at 462, 73 So. 2d at 317.
23. Id. at 464, 73 So. 2d at 317.
24. Id. at 464, 73 So. 2d at 318.
25. 430 So. 2d 673, 675 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 So. 2d 449 (1983).
26. 430 So. 2d at 675.
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The corporation eventually repaid all of these loans. The plaintiff took
no active part in the operation of the corporation except for a short period
when she served as secretary. The court concluded that their mutual error
was as to the legal effect of his ownership.2 7 The parties' erroneous belief
that the community existed between them and that the stock was com-
munity property did not have the "effect of characterizing the stock as
community property contrary to positive law .. ''28 The plaintiff could
not be vested with ownership of a one-half interest in the stock, for "er-
ror of law can never be alleged as the means of acquiring property." '29
To suppoit her claim to the family home the plaintiff contended that
her execution of an authentic act of mortgage on the family home, which
recited the marital status as husband and wife, constituted compliance
with article 155.30 Relying on Austin,3 the court held that this contention
was without merit since the community had not been reestablished ac-
cording to forms and solemnities prescribed by law.32 The court did not
discuss the effect of the deception practiced by the husband upon his wife
which prevented her from acquiring an interest in the family home. The
husband testified at trial that at the time of purchase of the lot upon
which the family home was built, he learned that the spouses were living
separate in property and "[hie purposely, in order to avoid his wife hav-
ing an interest in the property, instructed the lawyer to make the deed
out in his name alone." 33 However, sole ownership of the lot did not
prevent the husband from allocating to his wife the responsibility for super-
vising the architects, contractors, and workmen constructing the family
home. Nor did the sole ownership of the lot prevent the mortgage com-
pany from requiring both spouses to obligate themselves for the $60,000.00
mortgage on the home and lot. By rejecting the wife's claim that the
authentic act of mortgage constituted compliance with article 155, the court
allowed the husband, who had knowledge of the requirements of article
155, to deliberately withhold this information and to profit thereby. By
27. Id. at 677.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court cited for its authority Civil Code article 1846:
Error of law can never be alleged as the means of acquiring, though it may
be invoked as the means of preventing loss or of recovering what has been given
or paid under such error. The error, under which a possessor may be as to the
legality [illegality] of his title, shall not give him a right to prescribe under it.
La. Civ. Code art. (1846)(3) (repealed by 1982 La. Acts, No. 187, § 2 (effective Jan. 1,
1983)). Arguably, the courts' authority has now been legislatively removed.
30. 430 So. 2d at 677.
31. 225 La. 449, 73 So. 2d 312 (1954).
32. 430 So. 2d at 678. A similar argument was advanced in Maloney v. Maloney, 197
So. 2d 131, 134 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), stating that the recital of the marital status
in authentic acts of sale and waiver of the homestead exemption rights made the property
community. The court rejected this contention.
33. 430 So. 2d at 676 (emphasis added).
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requiring an authentic act to specifically reestablish the community, the
court negated any informal or formal reestablishment of the community
that was not in strict conformity with article 155.
In Freeman, the plaintiff advanced several alternative arguments to
overcome the requirement of strict compliance with article 155. She con-
tended that if there was no community, then she and her husband had
established a joint venture between themselves." The court found no
evidence to support the theory of an actual agreement, but concluded even
if there had been such an agreement, the spouses were nevertheless pro-
hibited from contracting with each other prior to the amendment to Civil
Code article 1790, which became effective January 1, 1980." S Since the
contract between the spouses was a relative nullity during the marriage,36
it could only be ratified by removal of the incapacity by divorce of the
parties37 or by legislative action. The legislature removed this incapacity
effective January 1, 1980;38 however, the court, in light of the circumstance
that the suit for divorce was filed January 25, 1980, found that the par-
ties did not ratify the contract.3 9 Furthermore, legislative removal of in-
capacity in and of itself did not ratify any prior agreement of the spouses."0
The plaintiff contended that if there was no partnership or joint, ven-
ture between the spouses, then the community was reestablished by opera-
tion of law as the result of the revisions to the community property regime
which became effective January 1, 1980.' The court responded that "even
if the community was reestablished as of January 1, 1980 this fact would
34. Id. at 678. See also Corkern v. Corkern, 270 So. 2d 209 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1972),
application withdrawn, 272 So. 2d 372 (1973), wherein the court also rejected a claim that
a partnership existed between the spouses on the basis that a partnership is a commutative
and synallagmatic contract which requires a mutual oral or written agreement between parties.
35. 430 So. 2d at 678. Act 627 of 1978 amended article 1790 to delete the reference
to husband and wife. This amendment was to become effective 60 days after the final ad-
journment of the 1979 Regular Session; however, § 5 of Act 709 of 1979 repealed in its
entirety Act 627 of 1978. Section 9 of Part Ill of Act 627 of 1978 contained a retroactivity
provision; however, Act 709 of 1979 contained no such retroactivity provision. Act 711
of 1979 deleted the reference to husband and wife in article 1790, thus removing the in-
capacity of husband and wife to contract with one another.
36. Nelson v. Walker, 250 La. 545, 197 So. 2d 619 (1967); King v. King, 390 So.
2d 250 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So. 2d 884 (1981); Monk v. Monk, 376
So. 2d 552 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979). In Nelson the husband and wife entered into an agree-
ment as to a partition of their community property and settlement of alimony rights of
the wife on the same day as the judgment of separation from bed and board was rendered.
The court found that both husband and wife had ratified the partition-alimony agreement
after the incapacity was removed by divorce through acceptance of the benefits of the
agreement.
37. Tilton v. Tilton, 162 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
38. See supra note 35.
39. Freeman, 430 So. 2d at 679.
40. Id.
41. Act 709 of 1979 repealed Title VI of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code (articles
[Vol. 45
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not alter the classification of the property acquired prior to that date .... '42
Thus, as all the property in contention was acquired before January 1,
1980, the argument was without merit.
The plaintiff, as a last resort, asserted a claim for the alleged com-
munity property on the basis that defendant was unjustly enriched and,
furthermore, was equitably estopped from denying her an ownership in-
terest in the property. The court refused to apply equity because the issue
had previously been rejected on the basis that equity could not be applied
since "the rights of married persons are provided for by express law."
'4 3
As a final argument, the unconstitutionality of article 155 under Ar-
ticle 1, section 3 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution was advanced by
the plaintiff." She claimed that it unreasonably discriminated against mar-
ried women by its application since women are generally less knowledgable
in business affairs. The court rejected plaintiff's contention succinctly:
"Article 155 is not gender based, [it] applies equally to both husband
2325 through 2437) and enacted new Title VI, (articles 2325 through 2376) under the heading
"Matrimonial Regimes," effective January 1, 1980. Section 1 of Act 710 enacted articles
2432 through 2437 of Title VI, relating to the Marital Portion.
42. 430 So. 2d at 679. Plaintiff had based her argument on Samuel, The Retroactivity
of Louisiana's Equal Management Law: Interpretation and Constitutionality, 39 La. L. Rev
347, 405 (1979); however, the subject of that article was Act 627 of 1978, which contained
a specific retroactive provision in § 9. Section 9 also provided that "this Act shall not
be construed to change the characterization as community or separate of assets acquired
or fruits and revenues accrued prior to January 1, 1980." Professor Samuel had speculated
that since Act 627 only excepted from its provisions spouses who had adopted an express
matrimonial regime, the legislature must have intended to subject to the legal regime spouses
who had obtained a separation from bed and board by judicial decree. Act 627 was repealed
in its entirety by section 5 of Act 709 of 1979. Section 11 of Act 709 provides that "[sipouses
living under a regime of separation of property shall continue to do so subject to the provi-
sions of this Act." But the Act contained no express provision against changing the
characterization of property acquired prior to January 1, 1980. Professors Spaht and Samuel
concluded in their analysis of the two acts that the omission in Act 709 as to the applicability
of the new regime to particular transactions and assets did not represent a change in legislative
intent from Act 627 to allow such changes in characterization of particular assets and tran-
sactions. Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited, 40 La. L. Rev. 83, 109 (1979);
see also Deshautels v. Fontenot, 6 La. Ann 689 (1851) (the court changed the classification
of the children of a slave. The slave had been the wife's separate property before her mar-
riage. Under the Spanish law, children of slaves became community property. But the court
held that because the child was born after the adoption of the Digest of 1808, the slave
was the separate property of the wife since the husband had submitted to the changes affec-
ting the community by his "adopting," through his legislative representative, the Digest
of 1808.).
43. 430 So. 2d at 680. See Austin v. Succession of Austin, 225 La. 449, 73 So. 2d
312 (1954); Jarreau v. Succession of Jarreau, 268 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 263 La. 986, 270 So. 2d 122 (1972). The court in Jarreau denied the living spouse
the usufruct over the deceased spouse's property because the spouses had not reestablished
the community by authentic act after judicial separation.
44. 430 So. 2d at 680.
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and wife, and is not unconstitutional. 45 In Corkern v. Corkern," the
first circuit rejected an argument that the application of article 155 violated
the constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the wife
stating:
Defendant wife was not required to reconcile with plaintiff hus-
band, nor does her ignorance of the law that the spouses remain
separated in property following a judgment of separation which
terminates the community, unless the community is unconditionally
re-established by the consent of both as manifested by an uncon-
ditioned notarial act as provided for by Louisiana Civil Code Ar-
ticle 155, result in a deprivation of her constitutional rights.47
Freeman clearly illustrates that regardless of the arguments advanced
by a party, Louisiana courts 8 will not recognize any interest in property
acquired subsequent to a reconciliation after a judgment of separation
has been rendered, unless the parties had executed an authentic act of
reestablishment of the community, prior to January 1, 1980, or had made
a matrimonial agreement reestablishing the community after January 1,
1980. Based on prior judicial interpretation 9 of article 155 after the 1944
legislative amendment allowing reestablishment of the community by
authentic act, the holding of Freeman is correct. Nevertheless, the prob-
lem of lack of knowledge by spouses of the requirements of article 155
has resulted in inequities for over forty years.
The other seven" community property states have avoided this prob-
lem. Arizona is the only state that provides for a separation from bed
and board that is analagous to Louisiana's separation from bed and
board." The Arizona judgment of separation does not automatically
dissolve the community in Arizona, for the parties may agree to the
45. Id.
46. 270 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), application withdrawn, 272 So. 2d 372
(1973).
47. Id. at 214.
48. Austin v. Succession of Austin, 225 La. 449, 73 So. 2d 312 (1954); Cotton v. Wright,
214 La. 169, 36 So. 2d 713 (1948); Barnes v. Barnes, 207 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1968); Efferson v. Efferson, 394 So. 2d 1294 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 So.
2d 1358 (1981); Emery v. Emery, 387 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Harang v.
Harang, 317 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Corkern v. Corkern, 270 So. 2d 209
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), application withdrawn, 272 So. 2d 372 (1973); Jarreau v. Succes-
sion of Jarreau, 268 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 263 La. 986, 270 So.
2d 122 (1972); Maloney v. Maloney, 197 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Sylvester
v. Sylvester, 137 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 3d Cir.), affirmed in part and modified in part,
243 La. 663, 146 So. 2d 154 (1962).
49. See supra note 48.
50. Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. See
also Rodieck v. Rodieck, 9 Ariz. App. 213, 450 P. 2d 725 (1969).
51. Id. at 728.
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contrary.52 The parties must both consent to the decree of legal
separation;" otherwise, only a dissolution of the marriage may be
obtained. 4 Arizona provides for a separation agreement which may in-
corporate provisions for separation of property, support, custody, and
visitation." This agreement is required to be either incorporated by
reference or set forth in the decree of legal separation or divorce.' 6 The
court, if it finds the agreement for property disposition unfair, may revise
the disposition of property or request the parties to resubmit their
agreement." California gives its court several options for effecting a divi-
sion of community property-division may occur either at the time of
the interlocutory judgment decreeing dissolution of the marriage, at the
time of the legal separation, or at a later time.' 8 Any property settlement
entered into by the parties before the final dissolution of the marriage
may be abrogated upon a showing of an intention of the parties to reunite
as husband and wife and a mutual revocation of the property agreement. 9
Idaho, Nevada, Texas, and Washington provide for the disposition of
the community property in the decree of divorce which dissolves the
marriage." There is no statutory retroactivity of the decree of divorce
or of the disposition of community property.' Nevada provides for a
decree of separate maintenance, but this decree only establishes rights of
52. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-313(B) (1977), 25-318(B) (1980). The amendments to
the Arizona statutory provisions at issue in Rodieck v. Rodieck, 9 Ariz. App. 213, 450
P. 2d 725 (1969), have apparently now conferred authority on the courts to dissolve the
community in a decree of separation from bed and board.
53. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-313(A)(4) (1977).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 25-317(A) (1973).
56. Id. § 25-317(D) (1973).
57. Id. § 25-317(B)-(C) (1973).
58. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4512, 4514, 4800 (West 1970). The California Legislature in
1983 amended these sections of the California Civil Code, deleting the interlocutory judg-
ment and creating a provisional judgment which becomes final 6 months after entry of
judgment. These amendments became effective July 1, 1984. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4512, 4514,
4800 (West Supp. 1984). See also Butler v. Bolinger, 133 So. 778, 781 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1931) (reviewing the effect of a California interlocutory decree on Louisiana immovable
property owned by the spouses and concluding that an interlocutory decree did not necessarily
terminate the community).
59. See, e.g., Rose v. Rose, 175 Cal. App. 2d 585, 346 P.2d 460 (1st Dist. 1959);
Walsh v. Walsh, 108 Cal. App 2d 575, 239 P.2d 472 (1st Dist. 1952); Morgan v. Morgan,
106 Cal. App. 2d 189, 234 P.2d 782 (2d Dist. 1951); Peters v. Peters, 16 Cal. App. 2d
383, 60 P.2d 313 (2d Dist. 1936); see also Annot., 35 A.L.R. 2d 707, 717 (1954).
60. Idaho Code §§ 32-601, 32-712 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150 (1979); Tex. Fain.
Code Ann. § 3.63 (Vernon 1982-83); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.09.030, 26.09.050, 26.09.080,
26.09.150 (1973). Washington Revised Code Annotated section 26.09.030 allows a legal separa-
tion on plaintiff's request if there is no objection by the defendant; however, 6 months
after entry of this decree, on the motion of either party, the court is required to convert
the decree of legal separation to a decree of dissolution of marriage.
61. See supra note 60.
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support and possession of real assets of the community.6" Washington
provides for a separation contract which may provide for a division of
the community property.6 3 This property agreement is independent of the
dissolution and may survive reconciliation, or even the death of one spouse,
absent a showing of an express or implied revocation of the agreement.64
In substantial conformity with the provisions of article 155 are the
corresponding articles of the Civil Code of Quebec and the French Civil
Code. Articles 530 and 536 of the Civil Code of Quebec require a
matrimonial agreement before the community is reestablished. 65 There is
no retroactive application of this matrimonial agreement; however, the
court may make the separation of property retroactive to an earlier date
before the filing of the petition for separation. 66 To make a reconcilia-
tion effective as to third parties, French Civil Code article 305 requires
the reconciled parties to execute a notarized instrument indicating the
resumption of community life which is then noted in the margin of the
certificate of marriage. 6' The reconciled parties are also required to adopt
a new matrimonial agreement to reestablish the community; however, there
is no retroactive effect to the matrimonial agreement.
68
Louisiana, by the automatic imposition of the regime of community
of acquets and gains on all spouses who are married in Louisiana or who
move to Louisiana (unless affirmative action to the contrary is taken by
the spouses), 69 has manifested the state's interest in having its married
62. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 125.190, 125.210 (1979).
63. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.070 (1973).
64. The implied revocation is based upon the wording of the instrument itself, the cir-
cumstances surrounding the transactions and the actions of the parties subsequent to the
execution of the instrument. See Garrity v. Garrity, 22 Wash. 2d 391, 156 P.2d 217 (1945);
Nelson v. Collier, 85 Wash. 2d 602, 537 P.2d 765 (1975).
65. Quebec Civil Code article 530 provides:
Separation as to bed and board carries with it separation as to property, where
applicable.
Between spouses, the effects of separation as to property are produced from
the day of the application for separation as to bed and board, unless the court
makes them retroactive to an earlier date in application of article 498.
Quebec Civil Code article 536 provides, "Separation as to bed is terminated upon the
spouses' voluntary resuming living together. Separation as to property remains unless the
spouses elect another matrimonial regime by marriage contract."
66. Que. Civ. Code art. 530.
67. French Civil Code article 305 (J. Crabb trans. 1977) provides:
Voluntary resumption of community life puts an end to judicial separation.
In order to be effective against third parties it must either be verified by a
notarized instrument or be the subject of a declaration to the official of the civil
status. Mention is made of it in the margin of the certificate of marriage.
The separation of assets subsists unless the spouses adopt a new matrimonial
regime following the rules of Article 1397.
68. Id.
69. La. Civ. Code arts. 2329, 2331, 2332.
NOTES
couples live under this regime.7" The only time this policy is not carried
out is after the reconciliation of spouses who have been judicially
separated. The spouses for the first time must take positive action to im-
pose the community upon their relationship.' It is submitted that to pro-
mote the mutuality and sharing of acquets and gains that the community
property system entails, the Legislature should enact an amendment to
article 155 which would embody the first proposal of Professor Daggett"
and allow the simple reconciliation of the spouses to wipe out all effects
of the judgment of separation including the separation of property. This
amendment would provide that if the parties reconciled, the community
of acquets and gains would continue as though there had never been a
separation from bed and board.
Opponents of the proposed amendment may argue that there are prob-
lems with determining when spouses have reconciled; however, Louisiana
courts have already decided what constitutes reconciliation.73 Reconcilia-
tion is a question of fact to be determined in each case by "all the ac-
tivities of the parties and by all of the circumstances of the case." 74 The
test is whether under the overall circumstances the parties had a mutual
intention "to resume voluntarily their marital relationship.""
Creditors should retain the same protection of their rights under this
amendment as they have under the present law.76 In Succession of Griffin,7
the second circuit held that where the party reinstituted the community
by authentic act almost twenty-eight years after were granted a separa-
tion from bed and board and some twenty-six years after they reconciled,
the reinstitution was retroactive to the date of filing of the original peti-
tion for separation. The court dismissed the claims of the heirs that the
husband had been incapacitated when the agreement was executed and
that the agreement was an attempt to evade forced heirship by giving
70. La. Civ. Code arts. 2329, 2334.
71. La. Civ. Code arts. 155, 2331, 2332. Matrimonial agreements may be either by
authentic act or act under private signature duly acknowledged. To be effective toward third
persons, matrimonial agreements must be filed, for immovable property, in the parish where
the immovable property is located, and in the parish of the spouses' domicile when the
concerned property is movable.
72. See supra note 16.
73. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
74. Millon v. Millon, 352 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977). See also Seymour v.
Seymour, 423 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Jordan v. Jordan, 394 So. 2d 1291
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Halverson v. Halverson, 365 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
75. Jordan v. Jordan, 394 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981). See also Seymour
v. Seymour, 423 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Halverson v. Halverson, 365 So.
2d 600 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Hickman v. Hickman, 227 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
76. U. S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1; La. Const.
art. 1, § 23. Civil Code article 155 provides protection for creditors between the time the
petition is filed and the judgment of separation from bed and board is rendered.
77. 398 So. 2d 1179 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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the wife one-half the decedent's estate. In conclusion, the court stated:
"[Tihe Griffin community exists as though it had never been dissolved
with the property rights flowing from the community being just as they
would have been had there never been a judicial separation . "... " The
effect of the agreement was to change all the property acquired between
separation and reinstitution to community property, a result which
necessarily affected all creditors who may have relied on the husband be-
ing separate in property. If a community can be reestablished and made
retroactive after twenty-eight years of living separate in property without
any notice or impairment of creditors' rights, then a reconciliation where
the parties are living openly as husband and wife will serve as an effec-
tive notice to creditors without any impairment of creditors' rights.
As Professor Daggett stated: "The layman does not understand the
present rule, which is not strange, as it is illogical. . . . The change might
encourage reconciliations."" The illogic is demonstrated by the applica-
tion of article 155 when spouses attempt to reconcile. Since spouses at
this point are more enthralled with their romantic relationship rather than
with the ironing out of their future economic and property status, the
difficulties of reconciliation are compounded by spouses having to return
to an attorney and execute a matrimonial agreement which necessarily
entails negotiation and agreement of the parties on the various provisions.
The deletion of this step would allow the parties to return to their former
relationship by a resumption of their marital life and might encourage
reconciliation since the haggling over the matrimonial agreement is
eliminated. A layman may conclude that since the reconciliation eliminates
all the other effects of judicial separation,8" then necessarily the community
is also reestablished. The layman's lack of understanding and ignorance
of article 155 may arise under any one of the following circumstances:
both spouses think the community continues as always; the spouses may
have been told of the requirements of article 155, however, either they
forgot what they had been told or did not understand what they were
told; or one spouse knows of article 155's requirements and deliberately
does not inform the other spouse. Ignorance of the law is no excuse since
everyone is presumed to know the law. 8 However, since no formalities
are required for reconciliation, there is no opportunity for the spouses
to be apprised of the requirements of article 155. Certainly, the effect
of article 155 is a trap for the unknowing and innocent spouses who are
attempting to reestablish their marital life.
Zina H. Tillery
78. Id. at 1182.
79. See supra note 16.
80. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
81. La. Civ. Code. art. 7.
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